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1. Introduction
This article aims to investigate the emerging awareness of environmental conservation in 
modern Britain from the perspective of ethics. The period to be focused on is from the late 
eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, also known as the age of Romanticism. Three 
issues closely related to this historical period are examined in terms of their significance for 
environmental awareness: natural theology, the principle of population proposed by Thomas 
Robert Malthus and the Romantic literary movement. By looking at these issues in roughly 
chronological order, the current article traces the foundational development of modern ecological 
consciousness in England as refl ected in philosophical treatises and literary texts around the turn 
of the nineteenth century.
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Population Principle and Natural Theology:
The Signifi cance of Malthus for Environmental Ethics
要旨：この論文は、近代の環境意識と環境倫理の成立を、自然神学、Thomas Robert Malthus 
の人口論、そしてロマン主義の 3 つの観点から考察するものである。
十八世紀の自然神学は、自然界の隅々にまで神の恩寵が広まっているとし、 自然の中に根源
的な調和や均衡、そして理想状態への進歩を読みとるものであった。その一方でこの論理は、
人間の行為は自然環境に根本的な悪影響を及ぼすことはないという考え方を導き、環境保護意
識の発現を妨げることになる。
これに対してマルサスは、人口増加と食料生産の不均衡を証明し、自然界には本質的な不
均衡が存在すること、そして人間の努力と道徳的節制によって、 この不均衡の悪影響が最小化
されると説き、道徳的行為者としての人間の行為が、環境の中で重要な意義をもつと主張した。
本論文はこのマルサスの論理が環境意識と環境倫理の成立を可能にしたことを論じ、ロマ
ン主義文学の環境意識につながる思想として、マルサスの人口論を再定義する。
Keywords: Thomas Robert Malthus, population theory, environmental ethics
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The impact of Malthus’s population theory on modern awareness of the natural environment 
has been recognised by literary criticism for some time (Bate 39, 47; Kroeber 82-94). While 
drawing on this recognition, in this study I shall investigate the environmental significance 
of human moral agency implied in the Malthusian theory of population. I hope that this 
approach contributes to a better understanding of Malthus in the historical context of emerging 
environmentalism and to aligning his views with the burgeoning literary movement of 
Romanticism and its environmental concerns.
The scientifi c study of ecology has a long history, dating back to the mid nineteenth century 
in the form of Ernst Haeckel’s neologism, Oecologie (Worster 192). In the twentieth century, 
the term was highlighted in the context of rampant pollution and other forms of environmental 
problems. Some typical cases were reported in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring of 1962. Since 
then, the issue of environmental conservation has been avidly discussed in various quarters, from 
scientifi c fi elds such as biology or physical geography to humanistic disciplines like sociology 
and philosophy.
Literary criticism was perhaps relatively slow to be aware of the disciplinary significance 
of environmentalism. It was not until the 1970s that serious critical attention began to be 
paid to ecological aspects of literature. In 1973, Laurence Goldstein’s article “The Auburn 
Syndrome” discussed the psychology of the poet William Wordsworth facing the loss of trees 
in his home village of Grasmere. In the following year, Karl Kroeber published an essay, again 
on Wordsworth, specifi cally alluding to the term ecology, “‘Home at Grasmere’: An Ecological 
Holiness.” Joseph Meeker in the same year put forward an explicitly ecological approach in his 
book The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology (Bate 180).
However, it took almost another decade before ecological approaches to literary texts were 
foregrounded and their interpretive potential was fully appreciated. Jonathan Bate’s ground-
breaking study, Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Environmental Tradition was published 
in 1991, and this study apparently led to the publication of another important work, Karl 
Kroeber’s Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imaginings and the Biology of Mind of 1994. 
Meanwhile, the term “ecocriticism” gradually secured its place in literary studies, with journal 
articles, anthologies of critical essays, and of primary literary works related to this critical 
genre appearing successively. This trend has continued to the present century. The genre of 
ecocriticism, or environmental literary criticism, has now been recognised as signifi cant presence 
in literary criticism and its neighbouring fi elds.
Among a number of issues that ecocriticism has dealt with, this article principally addresses 
itself to the significant role that Malthus’s population theory played in establishing modern 
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ecological consciousness. I suggested in my recent article, “Erasmus Darwin’s Quasi-
Environmentalism,” that the ecological views of eighteenth-century thinkers remained largely 
in a “quasi” stage because they failed to appreciate the significance of human moral agency 
in the economy of nature. Specifi cally referring to the case of Erasmus Darwin, I argued that 
the strong sway of natural theology over contemporary thinking prevented clear recognition 
of the environmental impact of human activities. Accordingly human moral responsibility for 
nature was not given due regard. I stated that these limitations in ethical awareness hindered 
the formation of a full-fl edged environmentalist attitude. On the basis of this assumption, in the 
current paper I shall investigate the innovative role of the Malthusian theory, arguing that the 
theory assigned a clear significance to human behaviour in the natural environment and thus 
enabled a more genuine ecological outlook.
This article also discusses literary Romanticism in connection with Malthus’s views. I 
shall claim that the philosophical shift in environmental attitude initiated by Malthus finds a 
comparable development in Romantic poetry. From the perspective of this literary movement, the 
rise of ecological consciousness will be further clarifi ed.
A brief remark should be in order about terminology before I proceed to the next section. 
There has been considerable discussion on terminology in environmental studies, leading to 
increasingly precise defi nitions of concepts and terms. This article, however, does not go into this 
side of discussion, as its objective is not to employ fi ne-tuned terminology to analyse the modern 
understanding of the environment, but to investigate more broadly how the ethical aspects of 
human behaviour in nature were recognised by Malthus and his contemporaries. Hence my 
investigation does not involve, for instance, determining whether a particular view can be 
characterised as of “deep” or “shallow” ecology. Furthermore, the concepts of environmentalism 
and ecology, elsewhere distinguished from each other with strict defi nitions, are employed here 
interchangeably.
2. The Sway of Natural Theology
Environmental degradation is not a recent phenomenon. Deforestation, for example, was 
already described in Plato’s dialogue, Critias, and in Roman times, agricultural development 
aggressively cleared the pristine land and infl icted extensive damage on the soil (Harrison 55). 
Lucretius in the fi rst century describes forests giving way to the cultivating hands of farmers: 
“. . . day by day they [farmers] made the woods retreat / Ever higher up the hills, surrendering / 
The place below to tilth” (5. 1370-72).
In Renaissance England, forests were gradually encroached as a source for providing fuel for 
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growing iron manufacture, and in Tudor times, deforestation was already extensive, with most of 
the native oaks felled to supply timbers for housing and shipbuilding (Kawasaki 116-20). Even 
politics were involved in forest deterioration. In the Interregnum, groves in Royalist estates were 
ruthlessly cut down by the allies of Cromwell (Thomas 218-19). The plight of English forests led 
to the appearance of the fi rst treatise on tree planting and conservation, Sylva, written by John 
Evelyn in 1664.
The eighteenth century saw a rapid urbanisation typically in and around the capital London. 
The countryside was transformed by the city’s demand for food and other commodities, the 
introduction of capital-intensive agriculture and deep-pit coal mining, and the construction of 
roads, canals and railways (McKusick 96). The prime mover of these developments was the 
Industrial Revolution. The whole of England was under its infl uence.
However, among philosophical treatises and literary writings, concerns about the natural 
environment were not very conspicuous. Alexander Pope, envisaging England as a powerful 
mercantile nation, does not worry at all about deforestation that his capitalist-imperialist vision 
may entail. In the poem, “The Windsor Forest,” trees are described to sacrifi ce themselves for 
supplying timbers; they are used for shipbuilding so as to link distant nations for trade (385-86). 
Optimistic stances such as this are typical of the eighteenth century, the era characterised by a 
progressivist-expansionist attitude.
Industrial processes, the means of transport and other aspects of modern civilisation are 
praised by James Thomson’s The Seasons. In the “Autumn” book of the poem, the human virtue 
of “Industry” (72) is applauded as it helps to build up civilisation by employing “the mechanic 
powers” (77), digging “the mineral” (78), taming the power of “fire,” (79) and having “the 
torrent” (80) and the “blast” (80) under control for human use. The cause of serving the modern 
way of life justifi es the axing of “the tall ancient forest” (81) and hewing “the stone” (82).
A notable aspect of Thomson’s poem is that it is based on the teaching of natural theology. 
Especially popular in the eighteenth century, natural theology seeks to demonstrate the existence 
and benevolence of God from the evidence of the created universe (Sambrook xiii). This 
inductive logic coexists with that of deduction. It is often the premise of the writers of this genre 
that God’s existence can be known a priori from reason alone, and not necessarily from evidence 
in the physical world (Eddy and Knight x). Irregularities observed in nature, for instance, need 
not be regarded as empirical evidence of the negative attributes of the creator. Because the 
existence of benevolent deity is considered a self-evident assumption that transcends experience, 
irregular features of the world are justifi ed by logical deduction. Accordingly, diverse aspects 
of nature observed in the changing seasons are considered to be benevolent signs of the “varied 
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God” (Thomson, “Hymn” 2).
Importantly, assuming the presence of all-benevolent deity can prevent awareness of 
irrevocable damage that humanity can inflict on the environment. Since human activities are 
subsumed under the good intention and harmonious planning of God, they can be understood as 
fundamentally harmless to nature. No matter how human beings may behave, they cannot give a 
signifi cant impact on nature, as nature is kept in or led to an optimum condition by the absolute 
goodness of deity. It should be noted that if the notion of a signifi cant impact on the environment 
is thus precluded, humans cannot be moral agents of environmental signifi cance. Because they 
cannot infl uence the course of nature to a signifi cant degree, they are not responsible for their 
own action as far as the natural environment is concerned. Human beings under this condition are 
exempted from environmental responsibility. As I argued elsewhere, for modern consciousness 
to acquire a truly adequate awareness of the natural environment and its conservation, it has to 
overcome this a priori mindset (Koguchi passim).
Natural theology was closely related to the science, or “natural philosophy,” of its day. 
Indeed, it was contemporary with and connected to the scientific concept of the economy of 
nature proposed by the theorist of biological taxonomy, Carl von Linnaeus. Linnaeus wrote a 
scientifi c paper on this subject in 1749, and it was translated into English as “The Oeconomy of 
Nature” ten years later. According to Donald Worster’s study, Linnaeus considers the world as a 
cyclical series of geo-biological interactions. In this rotating wheel of existence, which comprises 
propagation, preservation and destruction of species, all is evolving but fundamentally nothing 
is ever changed. Through an intricate hierarchical arrangement in which each species is allotted 
a place, nature’s economy forms an enduring community of peaceful coexistence. Even species 
striving to multiply beyond their present numbers are part of the benevolent intention of deity. 
The struggle to increase gives predators indispensable sustenance, and predators, in turn, help 
to keep a just proportion in population amongst all species. In this economy, humans have a 
privileged place. Linnaeus states that all the treasures of nature are created by God for the sake 
of humans. Thus they have the obligation of utilising their fellow species to their own advantage, 
and they are even entitled to eliminate the undesirables and to multiply those that are useful for 
them (Worster 36).
From the present-day point of view, population growth can be a serious environmental 
concern. However, as implied in Linnaeus’s harmonious system, natural theology regarded large 
population as an auspicious sign to indicate the good will of deity. For instance, population 
growth is considered of positive value by William Paley, one of the most vocal mouthpieces of 
eighteenth-century natural theology. His Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy of 1785 
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was among the most infl uential of the philosophical treatises of the time. It was in fact a long-
standing textbook at Cambridge University from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth 
century.
On the basis of widely accepted utilitarian views, which regard the greatest sum of happiness 
as the principal goal of moral philosophy and politics, The Principles asserts that growth of 
population is the means of achieving this target:
 The happiness of a people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the quantity 
 of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the number of the percipients, or the 
 pleasures of their perceptions. (587-88)
The “decay of population” is indeed “the greatest evil” (589). Thus the “importance of 
population” (589) should be given priority over “every other national advantage” (589). This 
does not mean that Paley entertains a pessimistic view. In his thinking, population increase is the 
predetermined course of the world, as it is deity’s benevolent intention that there is “the tendency 
of nature in the human species to a continual increase of its numbers” (590).
The Principles also alludes to the possibility of population exceeding the supply of food:
 . . . the population of a country must stop when the country can maintain no more, that is, 
 when the inhabitants are already so numerous as to exhaust all the provision which the 
 soil can be made to produce. (590)
Nevertheless, he fi nds that this “insuperable bar” (590) “will seldom be found to be that which 
actually checks the progress of population in any country of the world” (590). This inference 
is supported both by the fact observed by Paley himself that “the number of the people have 
seldom, in any country, arrived at this limit, or even approached it” (590), and by his estimation 
that “[t]he fertility of the ground, in temperate regions, is capable of being improved by 
cultivation to an extent which is unknown” (590). He even estimates that “the quantity of human 
provision raised in the island [Great Britain] would be increased fivefold” (591). Excessive 
growth of population remains too remote a possibility to make a real issue for Paley.
Richard Payne Knight’s 1796 work, The Progress of Civil Society, is another document to 
show the prevalence of the ideology of natural theology. The argument of this long philosophical 
poem closely follows the logic of the Linnaen economy of nature. The “Contents” of Book 2 
argues that, although animal species have “the general and unlimited tendency” (25) to increase, 
a healthy balance is maintained in the animal kingdom. This is owing to “those that live by 
destroying others” (25) and to “the universal dominion of man” (25). The text of the poem 
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elaborates this point:
       . . . through the whole the balance to sustain,
  And in porportion’d [sic] bounds each race restrain, 
 Each stands opposed to some destructive power,
 By nature form’d to slaughter and devour.
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 To fi x and regulate this general plan,
 Arose o’er all the moderator man. (2. 5-10, 29-30)
As the growing number of human beings “claim’d increase of food” (2. 37), animals decreased 
proportionately and “The hunter’s labours less productive grew” (2. 39). However, since human 
beings had “prospective thought” (2. 43), they eventually attained the ideas of taming and 
domestication. They then ensnared some “youthful brood” (2. 47) of animals to “copulate and 
breed” (2. 52) for their use. Some animals became faithful servants and came to “share / The 
shepherd’s labours” (2. 87-88). Others provided humans with “nutriment” (2. 62).
These processes caused a further growth of human population, which was then to be 
accommodated by the development of agriculture. From forest fi res, humans learned to use fi re 
to clear woodland for pasturage. The use of fi re led to the making of metal tools by smelting, 
and through the use of these “more effective implements” (3. 47), Payne Knight states, “Labour 
by art was methodized and fed; / And man’s dominion over nature spread” (3. 49-50). Livestock 
animals together with ploughs began to be used “To trace the furrow, and to turn the soil; / To 
break the matted turf, and sink around / The limitary ditch, and raise the mound” (3. 62-64).
With the expansion of arable land, the atmosphere was tempered and softened. This brought 
about a better environment for humanity:
       . . . e’en the elements to culture yield, 
 And catch the mellow’d temper of the fi eld.
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
       Hence milder airs from peopled regions rise, 
 And earth returns their blessings to the skies;
 Bids softer breezes o’er rich tillage blow,
 And warmer vapours melt the drifted snow,
 Less black the tempests from the mountain scowl, 
 And winds less furious from the ocean howl;
 In lighter showers descend the vernal rain,
 And numbing frosts with power less rigid reign. (3. 77-78, 83-90)
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Nature and art, or the environment and human society, are here unifi ed in a redemptive vision. 
The threat of increasing population and other environmental problems are absorbed and 
neutralised in a world-view that is based on the pre-established harmony of natural theology.
The blessings of population growth also constitute Erasmus Darwin’s philosophy. Many of his 
scientifi c works are secularised versions of natural theology (McNeil 57). In the philosophical 
poem The Temple of Nature, he describes overwhelming fecundity observed in nature:
 Each pregnant Oak ten thousand acorns forms
 Profusely scatter’d by autumnal storms;
 Ten thousand seeds each pregnant poppy sheds
 Profusely scatter’d from its waving heads;
 The countless Aphides, prolifi c tribe,
 With greedy trunks the honey’d sap imbibe; 
 Swarm on each leaf with eggs or embryons big,
 And pendent nations tenant every twig. (4. 347-54)
Darwin goes on enumerating the enormous reproductive power of other species. In addition 
to plants and insects, he lists snails, worms, frogs and herring. “All these” (4. 367), he claims, 
“increasing by successive birth, / Would each o’erpeople ocean, air, and earth” (4. 367-68).
The verb “o’erpeople” in the last quoted lines suggests a darker aspect of population increase, 
and this will be discussed in further detail in the next section of this article. Darwin’s stance 
nevertheless remains optimistic. In a footnote, he writes that an increase in “the number and 
quantity of living organisations, though many of them exist but for a short time, adds to the sum 
total of terrestrial happiness” (Footnote to 4. 387; 176). Like his contemporary Paley, Darwin 
believes in population growth as a means to achieve the greatest amount of happiness. This is 
refl ected in the redemptive vision he holds for a future state of earthly existence: “Life increasing 
peoples every clime, / And young renascent Nature conquers Time” (4. 452-53).
Darwin, Paley and Payne Knight belonged to very different disciplines: natural philosophy, 
Anglican Christianity and classical studies. Their views indeed vary. But they seem to have an 
important assumption in common: the world is presided over by the good will of God, and his 
nature and purposes are observable by looking carefully at the world’s harmonious organisation. 
It is clear that this framework functions to minimise the impact of anthropogenic harm to nature 
by reducing it into partial imperfections within a totality which is supported by benevolent deity. 
Such minor evils can even be thought to enhance the perfection of the world if we adopt the 
concept of the principle of plenitude, proposed by A. O. Lovejoy. The perfection of the whole, 
according to this unit idea of the history of ideas, consists in the existence of every possible 
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degree of imperfection in the parts (211). With all minor imperfections and temporal vicissitudes, 
the economy of nature can remain a system in which harmony and balance are maintained.
 Fundamentally then, nature is free from man-made disruptions, and from this very reason, 
human beings are not responsible for any signifi cant change in their natural surroundings. No 
environmental responsibility falls on their shoulders. Human beings, in terms of environmental 
ethics, are not moral agents of environmental significance, as his action cannot be of 
consequence in the natural environment. In the heyday of natural theology, ecological awareness 
and motivation for the conservation of nature were thus precluded from serious consideration. 
This intellectual situation was to undergo radical change by the arrival of Malthus’s population 
principle.
3. Malthus and the Ethics of the Environment
The harmonious balance of nature’s economy postulated by natural theology was destabilised 
by Malthus. Although his population theory did not completely confute the validity of natural 
theological views, it undermined some important aspects of this ideology. Malthus’s partial 
demolition of natural theology also helped to establish environmental ethics and modern 
awareness of environmental conservation. His Essay on the Principle of Population, first 
published in 1798, argues to the effect that an intrinsic imbalance is built in the system of nature, 
and that human will and actions are indispensable for the stable operation of this system. What 
human beings choose to do will infl uence nature’s economy, and consequently, human action is 
accompanied by an environmental impact. This inevitably leads to the redefi nition of humanity 
as moral agents of environmental signifi cance.
The title of the fi rst edition of Malthus’s Essay includes a reference to “Mr Godwin” and “M. 
Condorcet.” This indicates that the essay is intended as a polemic against these two thinkers, 
both under the infl uence of natural theology. In terms of religious beliefs and political allegiance, 
William Godwin is a very different thinker from the self-acknowledged natural theologist Paley. 
Yet part of his thinking approximates to Paley’s in considering the world in an optimistic light. 
Godwin’s argument is characterised by conviction in human perfectibility, and this notion gives 
him confidence in a bright future for humanity. In his principal work of the 1790s, Political 
Justice, Godwin seeks to fi nd empirical signs of ever-increasing improvement in social systems 
and in the human mind, while attempting to demonstrate the same claim by employing deductive 
logic based on the assumption of human perfectibility. This method of argument, pertaining both 
to induction and deduction, is similar to that which was employed by Paley’s Principles.
For Godwin the perfectibility of humanity is an unquestionable fact underlying the general 
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progress of society: “. . . perfectibility is one of the most unequivocal characteristics of the 
human species, so that the political, as well as the intellectual state of man, may be presumed to 
be in a course of progressive improvement” (Godwin, Political Justice 1793. 11). No matter what 
its present conditions may be, humanity will eventually learn to make the right choice and bring 
their course of action on the right track: “No mind can be so far alienated from truth, as not in the 
midst of its degeneracy to have incessant returns of a better principle” (29).
In 1792, when Godwin was writing his treatise, the French Revolution began to show signs of 
lapsing into terrorism. Owing to his strong belief in the good side of the human mind, however, 
he managed to keep positive attitude towards contemporary political developments. Referring 
to the short period of six years between the completion of the American Revolution and the 
beginning of the French, he envisages a near future in which “France, the most refined and 
considerable nation in the world, will lead other nations to imitate and improve upon her plan” 
(224-25). The 1798 edition of Political Justice famously foresees the achievement of an ideal 
state of society: “There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice, as it is called, and 
no government. Beside this, there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, nor resentment. 
Every man will seek, with ineffable ardour, the good of all” (777).
Godwin’s bright vision of future applies to his discussion on population. The fi rst edition of 
Political Justice alludes to a population principle similar to that which Malthus is to propose 
in a few years: “There is a principle in human society by which population is perpetually kept 
down to the level of the means of subsistence” (813). At the same time, though, Godwin thinks 
of enormous power of production latent in the European soil: “the average cultivation of Europe 
might be improved, so as to maintain fi ve times her present number of inhabitants” (813). Later 
in the same work, Godwin extends this view to cover a far distant future and a much greater size 
of population:
 Three fourths of the habitable globe is now uncultivated. The parts already cultivated are 
 capable of immeasurable improvement. Myriads of centuries of still increasing population 
 may probably pass away, and the earth still be found suffi cient for the subsistence of its 
 inhabitants. (861)
 
Like Paley’s natural theology, fundamental doubt about the sustainability of nature and society is 
precluded from Godwin’s system.
The other target of Malthus’s criticism, Marquis de Condorcet, makes basically the same 
claim as Godwin. In a work that discusses the perfectibility of society, Esquisse d’un Tableau 
Historique des Progrès de l’Èsprit Humain of 1794, Condorcet asks if the day ever arrives 
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when population growth exceeds the supply of food. The English translation of 1795, Outlines 
of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind, reads that “When the increase of 
the number of men surpass[es] their means of subsistence, the necessary result must be . . . a 
continual diminution of happiness and population” (4). Condorcet’s conclusion, however, is 
just as optimistic as Godwin’s: “There is no person who does not see how very distant such a 
period is from us” (346). By the time such a distant time arrives, civilisation will have developed 
technology that can deal successfully with population growth: “all the human race will have 
attained improvements, of which we can at present scarcely form a conception” (346).
Malthus contradicts the claims of these two thinkers. His argument is that there is a 
fundamental disparity between the rates of population growth and increase in the supply of food. 
A seemingly ideal state of society, as is envisaged by Godwin, is destined to collapse, because 
rapid growth of population caused by such a state inevitably leads to food shortage. Population, 
Malthus remarks, “when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio” (71), whereas subsistence 
“increases only in an arithmetical ratio” (71). A number continuously multiplying itself is what 
Malthus means by “a geometrical ratio,” and this applies in population growth. In contrast, even 
if we can assume that the whole agricultural produce of a country steadily increases, the rate of 
increase will merely be “by a quantity of subsistence equal to what it [the country] at present 
produces” (74). Thus “the human species would increase in the ratio of—1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 
128, 256, 512, etc. and subsistence as—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, etc.” (75). This principle is 
“necessity” (72, 76). Malthus probably uses this term in critical response to the “necessity” of 
infi nite progress that Godwin advances in his argument.
Malthus’s theory thus postulates an ineluctable confl ict between population and food supply. 
In actual terms the confl ict takes the form of “checks” that are constantly imposed on population 
increase. These checks are described as either “preventive” or “positive.” If a “foresight of 
the difficulties attending the rearing of a family” (89) prevents marriage, it is working as a 
preventive check. In the fi rst edition of An Essay, Malthus is hesitant to articulate what specifi c 
preventive checks are actually found operating among people. The second edition describes 
them more graphically: they are “promiscuous intercourse, unnatural passions” (qtd. in Flew 24), 
and “violations of the marriage bed” (24), coupled with abortion, or “improper arts to conceal 
the consequences of irregular connections” (24). Positive checks, are those which repress “an 
increase which is already begun” (Malthus 93) by bringing about premature deaths among 
people. Again the second edition is more descriptive: “all unwholesome occupations, severe 
labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, 
excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and 
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famine” (qtd. in Flew 23).
Malthus introduces another set of categories to classify population issues: misery and vice. He 
observes that “all these checks may be fairly resolved into misery and vice” (Malthus 103). My 
previous paragraph has indicated that many of preventive checks are morally vicious behaviours, 
and that positive checks and their outcomes fall in the category of misery. With vices and 
miseries, Malthus’s world picture seems to be very different from the rosy future that Godwin 
envisages and from the harmonious system of nature that other natural theologists delineate 
in their works. In Malthus’s view, population will grow until there is enough misery or vice to 
achieve a state of equilibrium—the Malthusian principle seems to deserve the name that one of 
his early editors coined: “the Dismal Theorem” (Flew 47).
However, as I suggested earlier in this section, some aspects of the Malthusian doctrine do not 
radically depart from the ideology of natural theology. For Malthus, too, the benevolent guiding 
hand of divinity, which natural theology presupposes a priori and attempts to demonstrate 
inductively, is an important assumption. The first influential thinker to use the phrase the 
“struggle of existence” (84), Malthus entertains an evolutionary view of the natural world, and 
its ultimate focus is on the development of the human mind. The world, for him, is “the mighty 
process of God . . . for the creation and formation of the mind” (202). God’s benevolent purpose 
and intention are “to awaken inert, chaotic matter into spirit, to sublimate the dust of the earth 
into soul, to elicit an ethereal spark from the clod of clay” (202). Everything in the world is 
subordinated to this evolutionary plan of God.
For the development of the mind, physical and mental exertion is essential. Painstaking 
exertion, to be sure, leads to the production of material wealth and worldly good, but its fi nal 
purpose is, as Malthus states, “to create mind” (204). On the other hand, Malthus thinks that 
human beings are by nature “inert, sluggish, and averse from labour, unless compelled by 
necessity” (205). Their only incentive to exertion is the avoidance of evil (Santurri 322), i.e. pain 
or suffering. By referring to Locke’s psychological theory, Malthus writes that “the endeavour 
to avoid pain rather than the pursuit of pleasure is the great stimulus to action in life” (204). The 
imbalance of population growth and subsistence is a design of God that provides an incentive 
to get human beings busy: “To furnish the most unremitted excitements of this kind [that rouses 
humans into action], and to urge man to further the gracious designs of Providence . . . it has 
been ordained that population should increase much faster than food” (204-05). Partial evil thus 
brings about “a great overbalance of good” (205) in the formation of mature intellect. “Want has 
not unfrequently given wings to the imagination of the poet, pointed the fl owing periods of the 
historian, and added acuteness to the researches of the philosopher” (203-04).
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Moreover, as Edmund N. Santurri points out, diffi culties other than the problem of population 
growth are also regarded as stimulating the human mind to intellectual and moral development. 
Such diffi culties include the obscurity of metaphysical subjects, arcane religious issues and the 
incompleteness of human knowledge of the natural world. Even the infinite variety of nature 
serves to facilitate mental development, because variety makes it possible to receive the vast 
number of impressions needed to awaken the mind from its material slumber, whereas uniformity 
and perfection cannot have the same degree of awakening power (Santurri 322).
The same logic can explain the positive signifi cance of moral evil. Malthus claims that “moral 
evil is absolutely necessary to the production of moral excellence” (210). It is essential for the 
formation of a mature mind to see moral evil and feel “disapprobation and disgust at it” (210). 
Observing that “ardent love and admiration of virtue seems to imply the existence of something 
opposite to it” (210), Malthus concludes that the perfection of human character “could not be 
generated without the impressions of disapprobation which arise from the spectacle of moral 
evil” (210). Because he accepts the view that partial evil and irregularity contribute to the 
perfection of the world, Malthus can be considered as subscribing to the principle of plenitude 
(Lovejoy 211; Santurri 322), which is also shared by Paley and other natural theologists.
Malthus’s population principle is thus characterised by heterogeneity. On one hand it 
acknowledges the existence of fundamental imbalance, evil and irregularity in the world. With 
population imbalance inhering in nature, the economy of nature is not perfectly cyclical and 
harmonious as previously imagined by Linnaeus. On the other hand, the unfortunate aspects 
of the world are destined to be eventually subsumed under the theory’s final cause: the full 
development of the human mind by the benevolent guidance of deity. In the process of the mind’s 
development, the theory also affi rms the signifi cance of voluntary human actions in countering 
the negative aspects of the world. Providential harmony, considered by Paley as existing in the 
current state of the world, is reconceptualised by Malthus into a temporal process of gradual 
improvement, in which human endeavour is assigned a crucial role. Malthus’s revision of natural 
theology’s world picture entails, as will be discussed later in this article, an important theoretical 
signifi cance for the formation of environmental ethics.
The second edition of Malthus’s Essay introduces the concept of “moral restraint.” Logically, 
moral restraint belongs to the category of preventive checks, as it means postponement of 
marriage on the basis of rational decision until a man “has a prospect of supporting his children” 
(Malthus, “Revised Edition” 126). Malthus also emphasises its ascetic side in his definition: 
“restraint from marriage which is not followed by irregular gratifications” (qtd. in Flew 25). 
Nevertheless, moral restraint is not merely the exercise of continence. It involves Malthus’s 
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central notion on the development of the human mind.
Santurri rightly claims that, for Malthus, an important form of mental development is the 
acquisition of the capability of reasoning from cause to effect. Such an ability manifests itself 
as foresight, or the power to determine the probable results of contemplated acts. A rational 
human being is one who exercises foresight, and creating such rational beings is the fulfi lment 
of God’s grand plan (Santurri 323). Malthus’s argument suggests that moral restraint can only 
be expected from individuals who have attained the capability of reasoning. From this height of 
intellectual development only, it is possible to infer benefi ts that moral restraint can bring and 
tragic outcomes that lack of such restraint will entail. If moral restraint is operating in a given 
community, this means that members have achieved a mature level of mind that enables foresight 
as well as prudence based on such foresight. While being a representative form of human action 
that counters the intrinsic imbalance of the world, moral restraint is also a sign of development in 
human rationality.
Having reviewed Malthus’s theory in comparison with natural theology, we can see the 
relevance of his population principle to environmental awareness. In the view of natural 
theology, human behaviour is given a limited significance within the economy of nature. In 
Paley’s universe, population growth is equivalent to the increase of happiness, and because of “the 
tendency of nature in the human species to a continual increase of its numbers” (590), humanity 
proceeds in the direction of general happiness. The European soil, according to Paley, has 
such an enormous potential for food production that the “insuperable bar” (590) to population, 
imposed by food supply, “will seldom be found to be that which actually checks the progress of 
population” (590). Although population growth theoretically entails its own problems, in actual 
terms, they do not constitute disruptive factors. Nature is full of signs of benevolent deity, and 
whatever the increase of population may be, a constant increase of happiness is guaranteed. 
There is scarcely any room for individual human beings to have an adverse effect on the food-
population situation, and by extension, on the economy of nature.
Population growth is not a problem for Payne Knight either. Darwin also sees the prolific 
reproductive power of nature in a positive light. Godwin agrees with Paley as far as population 
and food supply are concerned. Overpopulation and food scarcity are only theoretical to him. 
“Myriads of centuries” (861) from now, sufficient subsistence will still be available. On the 
Continental side, Condorcet’s optimism corroborates Godwin’s claim. Population problems, if 
at all, could materialise only in a very distant future. Even then, scientifi c improvements might 
well sort them out. Human beings, from these optimistic thinkers’ perspectives, do not shoulder 
responsibility for the environment. For no matter what they may do, they cannot influence 
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nature’s economy in a signifi cant way. Nature is always on the right track. Human activities are 
not strong enough to destabilise its course. Humanity remains local, innocuous and insignifi cant.
In the Malthusian world, by contrast, human beings are signifi cant players. Nature according 
to Malthus contains a fundamental imbalance in the form of the population principle. Population 
would rapidly outgrow the supply of food if checks upon it were removed. In actual human 
communities, stability appears to be attained, but it is at the expense of the happiness, health 
and lives of people, as population tends to grow until there is enough misery or vice to achieve 
equilibrium. In order to obtain a harmonious world order, exertion on the part of human beings is 
indispensible. Urged by the powerful stimulus in the form of the population principle, mankind 
pursues various courses of action to “support a more extended population” (206). They are 
also expected to exercise moral restraint to help to recover population balance. Malthus thus 
understands human exertion as a significant factor for the management of nature’s economy. 
Human beings, in other words, bear responsibility for the harmonious operation of the natural-
human environment. Clearly in this respect, Malthus departs from the tradition of natural 
theology.
Hence, in the Malthusian world, human beings can be regarded as moral agents responsible 
for the environment. In one of the seminal works of environmental literary criticism, Karl 
Kroeber observes that “Malthus’s argument . . . is that human beings . . . ought to recognize their 
responsibilities in relation to the facts of natural reproduction and subsistence” (88). He also 
comments that “the question of individual responsibility is not ignored even in a world seen as 
operating according to rigorous naturalistic principles” (88). The current article’s argument is 
in a sense an extension of these brief remarks by Kroeber. My reading of Malthus, as well as 
my discussion on natural theology in the previous section, has delved into the argumentative 
potential of Kroeber’s proposition.
A great divide exists between the nonchalant attitude towards nature of eighteenth-century 
natural theology and ethical concerns about the environment in the present era. I have indicated 
that Malthus can be placed in the transition between these two attitudes. We owe a great deal to 
this population theorist: awareness of the integral part that humanity plays in nature’s economy 
and of the responsibilities human beings bear in this dynamic but unstable environment.
4. Malthusian Aftermath and the Romantics
Malthus’s view of population attracted a great deal of contemporary attention. The success of 
the fi rst edition of An Essay led to a subsequent series of revised editions and republications. The 
second edition was out in 1803, followed by the editions of 1806, 1807 and 1826. In 1823 he 
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was invited to contribute an article on “Population” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. This was 
republished separately as A Summary View of the Principle of Population in 1830. Widely quoted 
and discussed, his propositions became dominant theoretical formulations on population in the 
nineteenth century.
Paley in his later years was infl uenced by Malthus. In his last major work, Natural Theology 
of 1803, he accepts Malthus’s population principle, approving of his central concepts of “the 
geometrical progression” (261) of population and the arithmetic increase of food supply. Paley 
also affi rmatively alludes to Malthus’s refutation of Godwin’s perfectibility theory.
However Paley does not simply concede to the claim of the younger population theorist. 
Natural Theology makes efforts to avoid some of the ruthless outcomes of Malthus’s principle 
by containing it within a framework presided over by benevolent Providence. In order to do 
so, Paley turns to intellectual, social and aesthetic happiness, as its degree is not dependent on 
the supply of provisions: “those [sources of happiness] which fl ow from a mild . . . government 
. . . those which spring from religion; those which grow out of a sense of security; those which 
depend upon habit of virtue, sobriety, moderation, order; those, lastly, which are founded in the 
possession of well directed tastes and desires” (262). Augmentation of collective happiness in 
society is the principal interest of this utilitarian thinker. As long as Paley is sure that the increase 
of some aspects of happiness is not restricted by food supply, he can circumvent the most serious 
consequences of the Malthusian theory.
The Malthusian perils of overpopulation are also taken up in Darwin’s Temple of Nature. Like 
Paley, Darwin tries to contain this potentially pernicious aspect of the organic world within the 
optimistic view of natural theology. In the fourth book of the poem, he describes extraordinary 
population increase among living things and checks operating on it in a manner similar to 
Malthus:
       So human progenies, if unrestrain’d, 
 By climate friended, and by food sustain’d,
 O’er seas and soils, prolifi c hordes! would spread
 Erelong, and deluge their terraqueous bed;
 But war, and pestilence, disease, and dearth,
 Sweep the superfl uous myriads from the earth. (4. 369-74)
Although these checks seem to be tragic events in the evolution of organisms, Darwin does not 
lay emphasis on this negative side of nature. He is satisfied as long as “every pore of Nature 
teems with Life” (380).
Darwin’s dismissal of the tragic consequences of the Malthusian principle is made possible 
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by his belief that death is only a transition in the progress of the organic world. Even “when a 
Monarch or a mushroom dies” (4. 383), in a few hours “Alchemic powers the changing mass 
dissolve” (4. 386), and new life springs up in innumerable buds and insects. Furthermore, some 
living things, after death, disintegrate and become part of the soil, forming “MIGHTY MONUMENTS 
OF PAST DELIGHT” (4. 450). Dead organisms do not lose the happiness they have felt while living. 
Their happiness continues to exist by being commemorated in mountains and other landforms. 
Hence, not just population growth but also resultant sufferings and deaths turn out to be positive 
elements in Darwin’s view of life. The benevolent guiding hand of nature leads the Darwinian 
world to ever higher stages in the face of the Malthusian dismal theorem.
While recognising the Malthusian imbalance of population in nature, Paley and Darwin 
assume the presence of a mechanism that maintains the health of nature’s economy. In this world-
view, human beings are not vital players that can infl uence the course of nature. Their actions 
not having an environmental signifi cance, human beings cannot be responsible for the economy 
of nature. Quite clearly, human efforts for environmental conservation do not make sense in 
the Paleyan-Darwinian world. The potential impact of Malthus’s theory is thus considerably 
blunted in these authors. Where then should we look for the signs of Malthusian aftermath and its 
environmental legacy?
This may sound odd, but in my view the Romantics can be regarded as important inheritors of 
Malthusianism. It has been known that the Lake School poets were hostile to Malthus’s theory. 
Although the complexity of Wordsworth’s reception of Malthus has recently been uncovered 
by Philip Connell (41-62), it still remains a common critical agreement that Wordsworth was 
basically opposed to Malthus’s “false philosophy” (Wordsworth, Prelude 1805. 12. 76). In 
addition, Coleridge’s verdict was that Malthus’s Essay was “exceedingly illogical” (1. 517) 
and it “had not confuted” (1. 517) Godwin or Condorcet as it purported to do. The reaction of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge to Malthus seems to be outright negative.
It is nonetheless worth consideration that Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s attitude to the 
environment has affi nities with Malthusian philosophy, not least in their understanding of human 
infl uence on nature. Like Malthus, the two poets think that human activities can seriously affect 
the environment, and this understanding is presumably related to their concern with the natural 
environment.
Kroeber proposed interpreting Wordsworth’s semi-autobiographical lyric “Nutting” as an 
expression of “a proto-ecological attitude” (62). The poem describes irrational destruction 
of a pristine forest nook by a nutting boy. According to the critic, this description expresses 
“the shame of an individual’s careless ravaging of the natural environment” (62). The poem, 
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recognising that human action can give rise to harmful consequences in nature, foregrounds 
ethical issues about human relationship to the environment. The poem’s narrator remarks at the 
ending, “I felt a sense of pain when I beheld / The silent trees and the intruding sky” (50-51). The 
guilt about the senseless ravaging of vulnerable nature is intensifi ed by this silent reprimanding 
from the near-transcendental realm. Having infl icted irrevocable damage on nature, the nutting 
boy is held accountable for his action. Young as he is, the boy can be thought of as a moral agent 
of environmental signifi cance.
Literary criticism has read Coleridge’s poem, The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere, as “a parable 
of ecological transgression” (McKusick 44). The central episode of the poem is the killing 
of an albatross by the protagonist old mariner. After this pivotal action, the mariner and his 
shipmates go through severe ordeals: heat waves, drought, starvation, the shipmates’ insanity 
and their eventual death. Hardship continues until the mariner blesses the beauty of mysterious 
water-snakes swimming around the ship. The mariner’s conduct can be compared to that of 
Wordsworth’s nutting boy. The man destroys the bird, or the spiritual essence of nature, and 
this action invites catastrophic consequences on himself and the human community he belongs 
to. The mariner has symbolically injured the natural environment, and, as well as undergoing 
physical suffering, he must bear ethical responsibility for it. The poem, involving a moral 
agent of environmental signifi cance in the person of the mariner, can thus be called a genuine 
ecological parable.
It is clear from these readings that Wordsworth and Coleridge have gone beyond the 
providential world picture of natural theology. In their poems, human action cannot be 
accommodated in nature’s economy, and owing to human presence, the natural environment is 
subject to disharmony, imbalance and potential destruction. Having examined Malthus, we can 
see that the poets’s views are similar to that of the population theorist. Wordsworth and Coleridge 
certainly did not think that they had beliefs and outlooks in common with Malthus. In an 
important sense, however, the three men made similar contributions to environmental awareness 
and ecological ethics, which have proved vital legacies to later generations.
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